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Critical Comments on United States v. Ghailani
Anthony O’Rourke*
Abstract
This article reviews the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit to uphold the conviction and sentence of Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, the sole
Guanta¤ namo detainee to have been transferred to the United States for trial.
Ghailani was captured nearly five years before his arraignment and argued that his
constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated by the delay. The article contends
that, in rejecting Ghailani’s argument, the Second Circuit distorted the doctrinal
framework governing speedy trial claims and mischaracterized the interests that
the speedy trial right is intended to protect. The article also explores the implications
of the Second Circuit’s decision for cases in which the government asserts a national
security interest in postponing a defendant’s prosecution while continuing to hold
the defendant in custody.
1. Introduction
Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani’s trial has had political reverberations that, at least in
the short term, have drowned out discussion on the doctrinal significance of
this case. Charged with the 1998 bombings of two United States embassies,
Ghailani, a Tanzanian national, avoided capture until July 2004. After nearly
five years detention ç first in Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) custody and
then under military custody at Guanta¤ namo ç he was arraigned in a United
States federal district court in June 2009. Ghailani is the sole Guanta¤ namo de-
tainee transferred to the United States for trial. His case thus served to test
whether the Obama administration could make good on its promise to close
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Guanta¤ namo and prosecute some of the high profile detainees in United States
federal courts.1
In November 2010, a jury acquitted Ghailani of 284 murder and conspiracy
charges and convicted him for one count of conspiracy to destroy United
States government buildings and property.2 The verdict owes in part to
District Judge Lewis Kaplan’s laudable, but doctrinally unremarkable, decision
to exclude the testimony of a significant government witness, whose identity
the government had obtained by interrogating Ghailani while he was in CIA
custody.3 Some heralded the verdict and Judge Kaplan’s ruling as proof that
United States courts are adequate forums for prosecuting foreign nationals
implicated in the war on terror.4 In the short term, however, the verdict has
strengthened American political resistance to transferring Guanta¤ namo de-
tainees to the United States for trial.5 The current federal budget prevents any
new transfers and it appears that Ghailani’s case may be the last of its kind
for some time.6
However, whatever the long-term political ramifications may be, the Ghailani
case involved one ruling that may significantly influence constitutional doc-
trine in the United States and abroad. In both the District Court and on
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Ghailani
raised a novel speedy trial claim, which is certain to recur in future national
security cases. The constitutional right to a speedy trial, Ghailani contended,
was violated by the nearly five-year delay between his capture and his arraign-
ment.7 Both courts rejected the claim and held that neither the length of the
1 See, for example, C. Savage, ‘Terror Verdict Tests Obama’s Strategy on Trials’, The NewYork Times,
18 November 2010, available online at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/19/nyregion/
19detainees.html?pagewanted¼all (visited 11 February 2014). In addition to Ghailani, the
Obama administration planned to transfer five detainees for trial in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York. See United States Department of Justice et al.,
Final Report: Guantanamo Review Task Force, 22 January 2010, available online at http://www.
justice.gov/ag/guantanamo review final report.pdf (visited 17 April 2014), at 11 12.
2 See B. Weiser, ‘Detainee Acquitted on Most Counts in ‘98 Bombings’, The New York Times, 17
November 2010, available online at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/nyregion/18ghailani.
html? r¼0 (visited 11 February 2014).
3 See United States v. Ghailani, 743 F. Supp. 2d 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (hereinafter ‘Ghailani, 743 F.
Supp. 2d’).
4 See, for example, D. Cole, ‘A Fair Trial, Without Torture’s Taint’, The NewYork Times, 5 February
2013, available online at http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/11/18/prosecuting
terrorists in federal court/a fair trial without tortures taint (visited 11 February 2014).
5 See C. Savage,‘In a Reversal, Military Trials for 9/11 Case’,The NewYorkTimes, 4 April 2011, avail
able online at www.nytimes.com/2011/04/05/us/05gitmo.html (visited 10 February 2014).
6 See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014, x528. It is worth noting, however, that the Obama
administration has continued to use the United States District Court for the Southern District
of NewYork as a forum for prosecuting terrorism cases involving defendants who were not sub
jected to long periods of detention following their capture. See, for example, B.Weiser, ‘Jurors
Convict Abu Ghaith, Bin Laden Son in Law, in Terror Case’,The NewYork Times, 26 March 2014,
available online at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/27/nyregion/bin ladens son in law is
convicted in terror trial.html (visited 17 April 2014).
7 See United States v. Ghailani, 733 F3d 29 (2d Cir. 2013) (hereinafter ‘Ghailani, 733 F3d’); United
States v. Ghailani, 751 F. Supp.2d 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (hereinafter ‘Ghailani, 751 F. Supp.2d’).
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delay nor the abuse Ghailani suffered during the course of that delay were suf-
ficient to establish a constitutional violation.
This critical commentary examines the Second Circuit’s speedy trial ruling
in United States v. Ghailani. This article argues that the reasoning of the Court
of Appeals distorts the doctrinal framework governing constitutional speedy
trial claims and mischaracterizes the interests that the right is meant to pro-
tect. Notwithstanding the Court’s assertion to the contrary, its analysis renders
the speedy trial right ineffective to protect defendants whose trials are post-
poned in the name of national security.
2. Factual and Procedural Background
In August 1998, the United States embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi were
bombed simultaneously, resulting in 224 deaths and several thousand injuries.
Based on their alleged roles in the bombings, the United States filed an indict-
ment against Ghailani and several other defendants in December 1998. This in-
dictment charged Ghailani with substantive offenses as well as ‘a broad
conspiracy by Usama Bin Laden and others to wage a campaign of terror
against the United States’.8 Several of Ghailani’s alleged co-conspirators were
captured shortly after the bombings and were tried and convicted in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in early
2001.9 Ghailani, however, evaded capture for six years, during which time he
allegedly remained an active member of Al Qaeda.10
Meanwhile, following the attacks on 11 September 2001, the Bush adminis-
tration established a CIA program to detain and interrogate individuals sus-
pected of possessing valuable foreign intelligence.11 President Bush also issued
an executive order authorizing the detention and trial by military tribunal of
individuals designated as ‘enemy alien combatants’.12 In 2006, Congress
authorized the President to establish military commissions to try ‘alien unpriv-
ileged enemy belligerents’ for violations of the laws of war and other offenses.13
Ghailani was captured in July 2004 and held in CIA custody outside the
United States for approximately two years. During this period, the CIA used
so-called ‘enhanced’ interrogation techniques ç including waterboarding,
8 Ibid., at 521.
9 See Ghailani, 733 F3d, at 38.
10 Ibid. The government contends that, after the bombings, Ghailani’s responsibilities for Al Qaeda
included serving as Bin Laden’s cook and bodyguard and working as a document forger. See
Ghailani, 751 F. Supp.2d, at 521. The government did not seek to introduce this information at
Ghailani’s trial. See B. Weiser, ‘Conspirator’s Path From Poverty as a Boy in Zanzibar to bin
Laden’s Side’, The New York Times, 23 January 2011, available online at www.nytimes.
com/2011/01/24/nyregion/24ghailani.html?pagewanted¼all (visited 11 February 2014).
11 Ghailani, 751 F. Supp.2d, at 521 522.
12 Ibid., at 522. See Military Order, Detention,Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non Citizens in the
War Against Terrorism (2001), x 4.
13 Military Commissions Act of 2006, x948b(a); see also Ghailani, 751 F. Supp.2d, at 522.
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facial and abdominal slaps, prolonged diapering, extended sleep deprivation
(for over 72 hours), stress positions, and cramped confinement ç on detainees
who, like Ghailani, were thought to hold high value information.14 According
to the CIA’s Office of Medical Services, these techniques were ‘designed to psy-
chologically ‘‘dislocate’’ the detainee, maximize his feeling of vulnerability and
helplessness, and reduce or eliminate his will to resist [the United States gov-
ernment’s] efforts to obtain critical intelligence’.15 The District Court’s findings
regarding the details of Ghailani’s treatment while under CIA custody are clas-
sified. The Court publicly concluded, however, that ‘the CIA Program was ef-
fective in obtaining useful intelligence from Ghailani throughout his time in
CIA custody’.16
In September 2006, Ghailani was transferred into military custody at
Guanta¤ namo.17 He received a hearing on his designation as an enemy combat-
ant in March 2007 before a Combatant Status Review Tribunal. The rules
provided Ghailani with a non-lawyer representative but forbade the representa-
tive from informing him of the content of classified material. In February or
March 2007, the Department of Defense began investigating whether
Ghailani could be tried before a military commission for violating the laws of
war based on his alleged role in the bombings of the embassies.18 In March
2008, after preparing a charge sheet and prosecution memorandum, the
Department of Defense brought charges against Ghailani. He was finally
arraigned before a military commission in October 2008. Several months of
pretrial motion practice followed, including a May 2009 motion wherein
Ghailani requested a speedy trial before the military commission.19
After taking office in January 2009, President Obama suspended the
Guanta¤ namo military commissions.20 In May 2009, the Obama administration
announced that it would transfer Ghailani for prosecution to the District
Court for the Southern District of New York based on the 1998 indictment.
14 Ghailani, 733 F. Supp2d, at 523.
15 Ghailani, 751 F.Supp2d, at 523, quoting draft Office of Medical Services Guidelines, at 1.
16 Ibid. The District Court also found that ‘the period during which he was subjected to enhanced
interrogation techniques and other treatment that he has recounted in an affidavit that re
mains classified, was not of sufficient length to be material’ to Ghailani’s speedy trial claim.
However, consistent with the Second Circuit’s analysis, the District Court further held that
Ghailani’s treatment while under CIA custody was irrelevant to his speedy trial claim because
there was ‘no causal connection’ between that treatment and his trial delay. See ibid., at 535.
The District Court’s analysis is subject to the same criticisms offered below with respect to the
Second Circuit’s analysis.
17 See Ghailani, 751 F. Supp2d, at 525.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., at 526. Throughout this period of prosecution by a military commission, Ghailani filed a
number of habeas corpus petitions and other motions for relief in federal courts. None of
these petitions included a speedy trial claim. See ibid. In March 2009, two months before he
was transferred for trial in civilian court, Ghailani filed a habeas corpus petition raising a
speedy trial claim in the District Court for the Southern District of New York. See ibid., at
525 526.
20 Ibid. See Executive Order No. 13, 492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4899, 22 January 2009, x7.
874 JICJ 12 (2014), 871 885
The military commission charges were dismissed without prejudice.21 Ghailani
was brought to the United States and he was arraigned on 9 June 2009.
Ghailani moved to dismiss the indictment on substantive due process
grounds based on the torture he allegedly endured while under CIA custody.22
The District Court disposed of this claim with relative ease. Specifically, Judge
Kaplan held that to the extent that the CIA’s treatment of Ghailani amounted
to a substantive due process violation, dismissal of the indictment was inappro-
priate because Ghailani failed to allege any causal connection between his tor-
ture and ‘the deprivation of life or liberty threatened by the prosecution’.23
In addition, Ghailani moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that his
constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated by the delay between his cap-
ture and arraignment.24 In response, the government acknowledged that it in-
tentionally delayed Ghailani’s prosecution ç first to place him in CIA custody
for the purpose of obtaining intelligence and then to try him before a military
commission in Guanta¤ namo.25 However, the District Court denied Ghailani’s
speedy trial motion and the case proceeded to trial.
In November 2010, the jury acquitted Ghailani of 284 conspiracy and
murder counts and convicted him of one count of conspiracy to destroy gov-
ernment buildings and property.26 The District Court sentenced him to life im-
prisonment.27 Ghailani appealed his conviction and sentence on three
grounds, two of which are not central to this article.28 Ghailani’s principal ar-
gument, however, was that the District Court abused its discretion in rejecting
his speedy trial claim.29
3. The District Court’s Speedy Trial Analysis
Ghailani’s speedy trial claim highlights a significant underdevelopment in the
law governing situations in which the government delays a trial to detain a de-
fendant for national security reasons. Ghailani’s claim does not implicate the
21 See Ghailani, 751 F. Supp2d, at 526.




26 SeeWeiser, supra note 2.
27 See Ghailani, 733 F3d, at 54.
28 First, Ghailani challenged the District Court’s decision to give the jury a ‘conscious avoidance’
instruction, which permitted the jury to find that Ghailani possessed the requisite mens rea
for the conspiracy charge even if he deliberately avoided learning whether his associates were
planning to attack an American embassy. The Second Circuit properly rejected this argument,
concluding that the government adduced evidence sufficient for a rational juror to conclude
that he was involved in a plot to attack American targets. See ibid. Second, Ghailani argued
that the District Court abused its discretion by sentencing him to life imprisonment. The
Second Circuit rejected this claim, holding that Ghailani’s sentence was both procedurally and
substantively reasonable. See ibid., at 55.
29 See ibid., at 36.
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detailed statutory framework that governs most speedy trial claims litigated in
United States federal courts. Most federal speedy trial claims are based on the
Speedy Trial Act, which is triggered when a defendant makes his or her first
court appearance.30 Ghailani’s claim, however, is predicated on the delay that
occurred between his capture in July 2004 and his arraignment in June
2009. Accordingly, the claim is based exclusively on the constitutional speedy
trial right contained in the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, which is triggered when the government files an indictment
against the defendant.31
Ghailani’s claim was, therefore, subject to the notoriously indeterminate doc-
trinal framework that applies to speedy trial claims based on the Sixth
Amendment.32 The Supreme Court has struggled to craft a tractable definition
of the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial guarantee and has repeatedly character-
ized the speedy trial right as ‘‘‘amorphous’’, ‘‘slippery’’, and ‘‘necessarily rela-
tive’’’.33 Accordingly, the Court has declined to interpret the Sixth Amendment
to impose any specific obligations on the government with respect to when it
must bring a criminal defendant to trial. Instead, in Barker v.Wingo, it estab-
lished a four-factor balancing test expressly designed to allow lower courts to
evaluate constitutional speedy trial claims ‘on an ad hoc basis’.34
Under Barker, in deciding whether a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial
right was violated, courts are required to consider: first, the length of the
delay before the defendant was brought to trial; second, the reason for the
delay; third, whether the defendant asserted his speedy trial right in advance
of the trial; and fourth, whether the delay resulted in prejudice to the defend-
ant.35 The Supreme Court stressed, however, that none of these factors in
Barker should be treated as ‘either a necessary or sufficient condition to the
finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial’, and that the factors ‘must
be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant’.36
The Court’s speedy trial jurisprudence thus leaves courts with ample discretion
to determine whether a defendant merits relief under the Sixth Amendment.
The Second Circuit used that discretion to reject Ghailani’s speedy trial
claim.37 As a political matter, this outcome is unsurprising. In an article
30 See 18 USC, x 3161(c)(1). For the observation that the Speedy Trial Act ‘has largely supplanted
the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause’ as the basis for speedy trial litigation, see R.J.
Allen, J.L. Hoffman, D.A. Livingston, W.J. Stuntz, and A.D. Leipold, Comprehensive Criminal
Procedure (3rd edn.,Wolters Kluwer Law and Business, 2011), at 1065.
31 United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971).
32 The Sixth Amendment to the US Constitution provides that ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial’.
33 Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 89 (2009); quoting Barker v.Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972) (here
inafter ‘Barker, 407 U.S.’).
34 Barker, 407 U.S., at 530.
35 See ibid.
36 Barker, 407 U.S., at 533.
37 Strictly speaking, the discretion to balance the factors in Barker lies in the first instance the
district court and the appellate court reviews the district court’s decision for abuse of discre
tion. However, as the Second Circuit observed, ‘in evaluating a defendant’s rights under the
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defending the concurrent use of both military commissions and civilian courts
to prosecute terrorism suspects, Aziz Huq recognized that jurisdictional com-
petition between these forums could incentivize courts to tailor their proced-
ural rules to the exigencies of the national security context.38 The test in
Barker lends itself to such tailoring and gives courts the discretion to foreclose
speedy trial claims threatening to the judiciary’s institutional interests. As the
first ç and, thus far, only ç case in which a Guanta¤ namo detainee has been
prosecuted in a United States federal court, the Second Circuit faced consider-
able institutional pressure to reject Ghailani’s speedy trial claim. A ruling in
Ghailani’s favour would have precluded the Obama administration from trans-
ferring other high profile Guanta¤ namo detainees for civilian trial where, like
Khalid Sheik Mohamed, they had been indicted prior to capture. Moreover, if
Ghailani’s constitutional claim had prevailed, the Court would have been
required to order that his conviction be overturned and that the indictment
be dismissed with prejudice.39 This remedy would have required the Obama ad-
ministration to make a politically perilous choice between releazing Ghailani
and transferring him back to military detention notwithstanding the Court’s
decision.40 Given these stakes, it is unsurprising that the Second Circuit
applied the standard in Barker to hold that Ghailani’s rights under the Sixth
Amendment had not been violated. However, while the doctrinal framework
governing constitutional speedy trial claims is highly malleable, the Second
Circuit’s reasoning nevertheless distorts the doctrine in significant ways.
The Court correctly held that the third factor in Barker ç whether the de-
fendant invoked his speedy trial right ç did not count against Ghailani’s
claim.41 Ghailani did not invoke his constitutional speedy trial right until
March 2009.42 There was no evidence, however, that Ghailani opportunistic-
ally refrained from invoking the right in the hope of having his indictment dis-
missed. The Supreme Court emphasized in Barker that a ‘defendant has no
duty to bring himself to trial’, and accordingly, a defendant in Ghailani’s
Speedy Trial Clause, a district court is in no better a position than the reviewing court to under
take the required balancing’. United States v. Ghailani, 733 F.3d, at 44. Accordingly, the Second
Circuit essentially engaged in de novo review of how the district court balanced these factors,
while according deference to the factual determinations that formed the basis of the district
court’s decision.
38 See A.Z. Huq, ‘Forum Choice for Terrorism Suspects’, 61 Duke Law Journal (2012) 1415, at
1483 1484.
39 See Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973).
40 In an opinion ordering the exclusion of Hussein Abebe’s testimony, District Judge Kaplan opined
that, regardless of the verdict, the government could detain Ghailani as an enemy combatant
as long as hostilities continue between the United States and Al Qaeda. See Ghailani, 743 F.
Supp. 2d, at 288; United States v. Ghailani, S10 98 CRIM 1023 LAK, 2010 WL 4006381 (S.D.N.Y.
6 October 2010).
41 Accordingly, as the District Court observed in Ghailani, a defendant’s failure to demand a
speedy trial is generally irrelevant to whether his or her constitutional right has been violated
unless the defendant has been ‘opportunistic’ in invoking the right. See Ghailani, 751 F.
Supp2d, at 529.
42 See the commentary contained in supra note 19.
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position should not be punished for failing to assert his speedy trial right ear-
lier in the course of his detention.43 The Second Circuit’s application of the re-
maining factors in Barker, however, is problematic.
With respect to the first factor in Barker, the Second Circuit held that the
delay between Ghailani’s transfer to Guanta¤ namo for trial before a military
commission ç in September 2006 ç and his arraignment in a federal district
court ç in June 2009 ç was long enough to trigger analysis under the re-
maining three factors. The Court’s application of this factor is flawed in two re-
spects. First, when analysing the length of delay for Ghailani’s trial, the Court
discounted the period during which Ghailani was in CIA custody because
that part of the delay ‘was caused by national security concerns’.44 The Court
assumed that, because (in its view) the government was justified in detaining
Ghailani for national security reasons, this period of detention is irrelevant
under the first factor in Barker. By making this assumption, the Court con-
flated the first factor, which pertains to the existence of a delay, with the
second factor in Barker, which concerns whether the government had an ad-
equate reason for the delay. In order to maintain an analytical distinction be-
tween these concepts, the Second Circuit should have recognized that the
entire period of delay between Ghailani’s capture and his arraignment was
relevant under the first factor.
Second, the Court mistakenly treated the factor on the length of delay exclu-
sively as a threshold question, which, if resolved in the defendant’s favour, re-
quires balancing of the three remaining factors in Barker. In Doggett v. United
States, however, the Supreme Court stressed this factor involves a twofold in-
quiry. As a threshold matter, a defendant must establish ‘that the interval be-
tween accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from
‘‘presumptively prejudicial’’ delay’.45 Once this threshold has been met, the
court should consider, ‘as one factor among several, the extent to which the
delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examin-
ation of the claim’.46
In Ghailani, the Court faithfully described this two stage process when sum-
marizing the test in Barker.47 When it applied the test, however, the Court did
not treat the unusual length of the delay as a factor that, on balance, weighed
in favour of Ghailani’s constitutional claim. Instead, the Court merely con-
cluded that the length of delay ‘was long enough to trigger the Barker analysis’,
and then proceeded to balance the remaining three factors in Barker.48 In
other words, the Court properly analysed whether the length of delay was suf-
ficient for his speedy trial claim to merit further scrutiny. However, it failed to
consider the delay ‘as one factor among several’ relevant to whether a Sixth
43 Barker, 407 U.S., at 527.
44 Ghailani, 733 F.3d, at 46.
45 Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 (1992) (hereinafter ‘Doggett, 505 U.S.’).
46 Ibid.
47 See Ghailani, 733 F3d, at 43.
48 See ibid., at 46.
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Amendment violation had occurred.49 Granted, if the Court had properly
balanced the length of Ghailani’s delay alongside the other factors, the period
of five years would not have been sufficient in itself to establish a speedy trial
violation. For example, the delay at issue in Barker exceeded five years and the
Supreme Court nonetheless rejected the speedy trial claim in light of the de-
fendant’s own culpability in bringing about the delay.50 Nevertheless, a proper
consideration of this factor would have revealed Ghailani’s speedy trial claim
to be much more compelling than the Court deemed so.
The Court’s analysis of the second factor in Barker ç the reason for the
delay ç is still more troubling. In Barker, the Supreme Court stressed that
this factor requires judges to consider the government’s culpability for a trial
delay.51 A ‘deliberate attempt to delay’ weighs heavily against the government,
a ‘neutral’ reason for delay counts against the government’s case to a lesser
degree, and a ‘valid’ reason for delay falls in its favour.52 In Ghailani, the
Second Circuit held that the government did not deliberately delay the trial
and its culpability for the delay differed with respect to two different time peri-
ods. For the period of time when Ghailani was detained in Guanta¤ namo, the
Court held that the government had a neutral reason for delaying Ghailani’s
trial.53 The Court’s analysis with respect to this issue, however, is confusing to
say the least. Although Ghailani was transferred to Guanta¤ namo in
September 2006, the government did not provide him with a hearing before
the Combatant Status Review Tribunal until March 2007, and did not bring
charges before a military commission until March 2008.54 The Second Circuit,
however, mistakenly analysed Ghailani’s entire tenure at Guanta¤ namo, includ-
ing the first year and a half, as a period during which the government was ‘pre-
paring to prosecute Ghailani before the military commission’.55 The Court
held that this delay weighed against the government because it was the prod-
uct of its own choice to try Ghailani before a military commission.56
Puzzlingly, however, the Court also stated that ‘[s]ome significant period of
delay’ while the government was preparing to try Ghailani before a military
commission was ‘reasonable’, and that ‘the pertinent factors’ bearing upon
49 Doggett, 505 U.S., at 652.
50 See Barker, 407 U.S., at 533 537. Indeed, the Supreme Court approved a 90 month delay be
tween a defendant’s trial and indictment that was caused in part by the government having
filed several interlocutory appeals. See United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302 (1986), at
312 313 (hereinafter ‘Loud Hawk’).
51 See Barker, 407 U.S., at 531.
52 Ibid.
53 See Ghailani, 733 F3d, at 49.
54 See ibid., at 39 40
55 Ibid., at 49. The District Court did not make the same error. Instead District Judge Kaplan recog
nized that the only justification the government offered for failing to proceed with Ghailani’s
trial between September 2006 and March 2007 was its interest in preventing Ghailani from
engaging in hostile acts towards the United States. Judge Kaplan rejected this justification, rea
soning that the government could have accomplished its goal by incarcerating Ghailani while
he awaited criminal trial in the United States. See Ghailani, 751 F. Supp.2d, at 536 537.
56 Ghailani, 733 F.3d, at 50.
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this period of delay ‘sufficiently favor the government’.57 Given these errors of
internal logic, extraction of any clear doctrinal principles from the analysis by
the Second Circuit is difficult.
By contrast, the Second Circuit’s analysis of the two-year period when
Ghailani was held in CIA custody is clear, but disturbing. For this period, the
Court held that there was a valid reason for the delay, namely, national secur-
ity.58 With the exception of the District Court’s ruling on the claim of a speedy
trial in Ghailani, the Second Circuit appears to have been the first United
States court to confront a speedy trial claim based on the government’s deci-
sion to delay a criminal trial while keeping a defendant in extended detention
for interrogation purposes. In addressing the government’s rationale for hold-
ing Ghailani in CIA custody, the Court held that it was obligated to ‘accord:::
deference’ to the Executive’s decision-making in the national security context.
In light of this deference, the Second Circuit accepted the CIA’s determination
that: first, Ghailani could provide valuable information concerning Al Qaeda’s
operations; and second, the government could not obtain this information
while simultaneously prosecuting Ghailani in a federal court.
With respect to his time in CIA custody, Ghailani argued that the govern-
ment had to bear the cost of foregoing a criminal conviction where, instead of
bringing him to trial, it chose to hold him for the purpose of extracting intelli-
gence.59 In rejecting this argument, the Second Circuit adopted a reading of
Barker that is both novel and ill reasoned. In Barker, the Supreme Court
excused a trial delay that could be characterized as intrinsic to the criminal ad-
judication process. Specifically, the government delayed the defendant’s trial
while it sought to prosecute a potential witness in order to secure his testi-
mony against the defendant.60 Thus, the government chose to delay the de-
fendant’s trial in order to better ensure that it had the evidence necessary to
obtain a conviction. In Ghailani, however, the Second Circuit applies the
factor in Barker on the reason for the delay to excuse one that the government
chose to create for a reason extrinsic to the criminal adjudication process.
Specifically, the government did not delay Ghailani’s trial in order to better
ensure his conviction, but to pursue the alternative goal of using Ghailani to
obtain intelligence information.
None of the precedents the Second Circuit cites for this reading of Barker
actually supports the conclusion that courts may excuse delays for reasons
extrinsic to the criminal adjudication process.61 Moreover, in Doggett, the
57 Ibid., at 49.
58 Ibid., at 46 47.
59 See Ghailani Opening Brief (redacted), 17 January 2012, available online at http://www.
lawfareblog.com/wp content/uploads/2012/05/2012 05 31 Ghailani Brief 2nd Cir.pdf (visited
11 February 2014), at 55 57 (hereinafter ‘Ghailani Opening Brief’).
60 See Barker v.Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), at 517 518.
61 All but one of the cases the Second Circuit cites in support of its conclusion concerning trial
delays that the government caused in order to prosecute a criminal defendant more effectively.
See Ghailani, 733 F3d, at 46 47. These include the type of delay at issue in Barker as well as
delays in which the government filed an interlocutory appeal challenging a district court’s
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Supreme Court characterized the second factor in Barker as an inquiry into
‘whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that
delay’.62 This gloss on Barker suggests that, if the government deliberately
chooses to delay a trial to pursue a goal that is unrelated to the defendant’s con-
viction, the strength of the defendant’s speedy trial claim does not depend on
the merit of that goal. Thus, as Ghailani’s counsel argued, Barker does not
permit the government to stop the clock on a criminal prosecution in order to
detain and extract intelligence from the accused. Regardless whether the gov-
ernment’s national security interest is compelling or whether its intelligence
gathering methods are appropriate, it must accept constitutional cost of any
trial delay it creates in order to pursue that interest.
Finally, the Second Circuit’s analysis of the fourth factor in Barker ç
whether the defendant was prejudiced by the delay ç is at stark odds with its
conclusion that the government’s national security objectives are relevant to
the strength of a defendant’s speedy trial claim. The Supreme Court has held
that the ways in which a defendant may be prejudiced include being subjected
to ‘oppressive pretrial incarceration’.63 Drawing upon this precedent, Ghailani
argued that he was prejudiced by the physical and psychological harm that
he suffered as a result of the ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ applied on
him during CIA custody.64 In addressing this argument, the Second Circuit
held that any harm Ghailani suffered while in CIA custody did not count as
prejudice under Barker because it was ‘not incarceration for the purpose of
awaiting trial’.65 The Second Circuit observed that, in cases where a defendant
is being incarcerated for a separate crime during a trial delay, courts have
held that the delay did not result in the defendant’s pretrial incarceration.
Analogously, the court reasoned, ‘Ghailani would have been detained by the
CIA for the purpose of obtaining information whether or not he was awaiting
trial, and the conditions of his detention were a product of the CIA’s investiga-
tion, not incarceration as a prelude to trial’.66 Therefore, his detention was not
order to exclude evidence, see Loud Hawk, at 312 313; and decided whether it was appropriate
to seek the death penalty (United States v. Abad, 514 F3d 271 (2d Cir. 2008) at 274 (hereinafter
‘Abad’). In the remaining case, the Supreme Court denied a constitutional speedy trial claim
caused by the government postponing a prosecution while the defendant was being brought
to trial in a separate jurisdiction. See Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77 (1905), at 86 87. However,
as District Judge Kaplan correctly observed, in cases such as Beavers there is an ‘inherent need
for one of two cases involving different crimes, each subject to the Speedy Trial Clause, to pro
ceed first’. Ghailani, 751 F. Supp.2d, at 538 539.
62 Doggett, 505 U.S., at 651.
63 Barker, 407 U.S., at 532; see also Doggett, 505 U.S., at 654.
64 See Ghailani Opening Brief, at 69 79. Ghailani also argued that he was prejudiced because the
trial delay hampered his ability to prepare a defense. See ibid., at 70, 79 88. The Court held
that Ghailani failed to identify specific ways in which the trial delay (as opposed to other gov
ernment conduct) impaired his defense and that he lacked support for many of his claims con
cerning the tactical advantages that the government gained through delaying his trial. See
Ghailani, 733 F.3d, at 51.
65 Ghailani, 733 F.3d, at 51.
66 Ibid.
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the sort of ‘oppressive pretrial incarceration’ that the Supreme Court contem-
plated in Barker.
In reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit failed to recognize the causal
link between the government’s decision to postpone Ghailani’s criminal trial
and the interrogations he endured while under CIA custody. In cases where
the defendant is being imprisoned for a separate crime during the course of a
trial delay, there is no causal link between the delay of a trial and the fact that
the defendant was incarcerated during that period of delay. In Ghailani’s case,
however, the government acknowledged that its decision to ‘detain and interro-
gate’ Ghailani ‘had the effect of delaying his criminal trial’.67 As described
above, the Second Circuit endorsed this decision, holding that the government
may delay a trial for national security reasons that are extrinsic to the criminal
adjudication process. In doing so, the Court acknowledged that the govern-
ment sometimes has a choice, as with Ghailani, between bringing a defendant
to trial or subjecting him to extrajudicial detention and interrogation. The
District Court found (and the Second Circuit accepted) that, in Ghailani’s case,
these choices were mutually exclusive: the government could either conduct
an effective interrogation or bring Ghailani to trial on a timely basis.68
It follows that, if the government had chosen to bring Ghailani to trial in-
stead of holding him in CIA custody, he would have been spared the enhanced
interrogation techniques that the government used to extract intelligence.
When interpreting the factor concerning prejudice in Barker, however, the
Second Circuit elides the existence of this choice. Instead, the Court treats the
detention of Ghailani as though it was inevitable and unrelated to the decision
not to present Ghailani for trial. Thus, the Court adopted a framework for eval-
uating constitutional speedy trial claims whereby the government’s national
security interests weigh in its favour, but the means by which the government
pursues those interests is deemed constitutionally irrelevant.
4. Some Critical Comments
In rejecting Ghailani’s speedy trial claim, the Second Circuit was careful to
assert that it was not establishing a general national security exception to the
Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial right.69 As a practical matter, however, it is dif-
ficult to see how the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the framework in
Barker places any meaningful constraints on the government in national se-
curity cases. The Court’s reading of the factor on the reason for the delay
67 Government Response Brief (redacted), 17 October 2012, available online at http://www.
lawfareblog.com/wp content/uploads/2013/04/2012 10 17 Ghailani Response Brief.pdf (visited
11 February 2014), at 63.
68 According to the District Court, ‘the evidence show[ed] that the government had reason to be
lieve that this valuable intelligence could not have been obtained except by putting Ghailani
into that program and that it could not successfully have done so and prosecuted him in federal
court at the same time’. See Ghailani, 751 F. Supp.2d, at 533.
69 See Ghailani, 733 F3d, at 48 49.
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enables the government to delay a trial for national security reasons without
fear that the delay will strengthen the defendant’s speedy trial claim.
Moreover, if the government chooses to exercise this prerogative, the Court’s
reading of the prejudice factor ensures that it will not be held responsible for
any harm the defendant suffers during the course of the trial delay.
Even if Ghailani remains the only Guanta¤ namo detainee to have been trans-
ferred to the United States for trial, the doctrinal implications of this analysis
are troubling. In an essay criticizing the decision to try Ghailani in a federal
court, former United States Attorney General Michael Mukasey suggested that
the stakes of the case could incentivize courts to distort constitutional doctrine
in order to ensure Ghailani’s conviction. Furthermore, Mukasey cautioned, the
doctrinal rules that emerge from Ghailani’s case will be ‘nearly impossible to
confine::: solely to terrorism cases’.70 Unfortunately, the Second Circuit’s treat-
ment of Ghailani’s speedy trial claim appears to validate Mukasey’s prediction.
Consider, for example, how the government may choose to proceed with an
indicted defendant who is known to possess sensitive governmental informa-
tion and who could not be prosecuted without creating some risk of that infor-
mation being publicly disclosed. Could the government detain this defendant
ç a defendant not unlike Edward Snowden ç to protect itself against an in-
formation leak? Once the defendant is detained, could the government post-
pone the defendant’s trial until such a time that public disclosure of the
information no longer presents a threat to the government? The constitutional
right to a speedy trial should serve as a bulwark against such governmental
overreach. The Second Circuit’s opinion in Ghailani, however, could be drawn
upon to construct a plausible doctrinal argument that the right would not
apply in such a case. Specifically, in other contexts, the Supreme Court has
declared that the government has a compelling interest in preventing the dis-
closure of sensitive governmental information.71 Under the Second Circuit’s
analysis of Barker, this government interest ç potentially combined with a na-
tional security interest if the information includes military intelligence ç
would seem more than sufficient to excuse a lengthy trial delay. Moreover,
under Ghailani, the defendant’s detention for the purpose of preventing an in-
formation leak would not qualify as the sort of prejudice that strengthens a
speedy trial claim. Thus, the right to a speedy trial, as it was construed in
Ghailani, would be of little value to the hypothetical defendant.
Even if United States courts limited Ghailani’s application to terrorism cases,
the opinion could have a pernicious effect on how the speedy trial right is
applied in other jurisdictions. The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed in a
number of national constitutions and international agreements,72 and the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Barker has provided an influential framework for
70 M.B. Mukasey,‘The Obama Administration and theWar on Terror’, 33 Harvard Journal of Law and
Public Policy (2010) 953, at 961.
71 See National Treasury Employees Union v.Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677 (1989).
72 See M.C. Bassiouni, ‘Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International
Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions’, 3 Duke Journal of
Comparative & International Law (1993) 235, at 285 286.
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delineating the scope of this right.73 This framework, as it has traditionally
been interpreted in United States courts, could serve to deter governments
from subjecting individuals who are perceived as national security threats to
prolonged extrajudicial detention. By detaining individuals for reasons unre-
lated to the criminal process, such governments create the type of trial delays
and inflict the type of injuries, for which they have traditionally been respon-
sible under Barker. Under Ghailani, however, these governments could plaus-
ibly argue that their national security interests render the speedy trial right
inoperative in a broad range of circumstances.
5. Conclusion
By design, the framework set out in Barker allows judges to undertake the type
of highly contextualized, fact-sensitive analysis necessary to determine
whether a trial delay was appropriate under unusual circumstances.
Notwithstanding its malleability, the framework can discipline courts to exam-
ine whether government created delay exceeded the length necessary to effect-
ively prosecute a defendant and evaluate the extent to which the delay
harmed the defendant. However, in addressing Ghailani’s speedy trial claim,
the Second Circuit adopted an interpretation of Barker that fails to attend to
these considerations. Instead, under the Second Circuit’s interpretation of
Barker, the government may, in the name of national security, extrajudicially
detain individuals for prolonged periods without fear that doing so will bar it
from subsequently prosecuting those individuals in civilian courts.
When called upon to balance the demands of the speedy trial right against
claims of national security, courts not bound by Ghailani would be well advised
to reject the Second Circuit’s interpretation of Barker. Instead, it should be
recognized that, under Barker, the government should not be excused for creat-
ing trial delays justified by reasons extrinsic to the criminal adjudication pro-
cess ç even if those extrinsic reasons are as normatively compelling as the
interest in national security. In other words, under the factor in Barker ad-
dressing the reason for the delay, courts should look favourably upon the gov-
ernment’s decision to delay a trial for reasons that are intrinsic to the criminal
process. Examples include securing a witness’s testimony,74 filing an interlocu-
tory appeal,75 and evaluating the level of punishment for which it will advo-
cate.76 However, courts should disfavour the government’s decision to delay a
trial in the interest of national security. Moreover, under Barker’s prejudice
factor, courts acknowledge that there is a causal connection between the
73 For example, the Barker framework has been adopted by the Canadian Supreme Court, see
R. v. Askov, 2 S.C.R. 1199 (1990); the South African Supreme Court, see Bothma v. Els, CCT 21/
09 [2009] ZACC 27; and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, see
Sentencing Judgment, Mrda (IT 02 59 S),Trial Chamber, 31 March 2004, xx97 102.
74 See Barker, 407 U.S., at 517 518.
75 See Loud Hawk, at 312 313.
76 SeeAbad, at 271, 274.
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government’s decision to postpone a trial for national security reasons, and the
treatment that a detainee receives during that period of postponement.
Of course, this approach carries obvious and significant costs. It may, for
example, make civilian trials constitutionally impossible for defendants, like
Ahmed Ghailani, whom are brought to court only after years of detention
and torture at the hands of a government that is seeking to prosecute them.
These costs, however, are precisely the type of disincentives against prolonged
detention that the speedy trial right is designed to create. By penalizing the
decision to detain an individual for national security reasons, the Barker
framework could help deter the government from making that decision lightly.
The Second Circuit’s interpretation of Barker, however, generates the opposite
incentives and thus reflects a troubling conception of the speedy trial right.
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